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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
~IARK KASFELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OGDEX CITY, UTAH, 
a municipal corporation, 
Defendant. 
STATE:}IENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set out in the plaintiff's brief 
is a correct statement of the facts as stipulated and 
which are therefore controlling in this appeaL 
STATE1vfENT OF POIN~rs 
~rhe city will answer and argue the five points posed 
by the appellant in the order set forth and argued in 
appellant's brief. In addition, the city contends that 
its ordinance No. 343 is merely declarative of what was 
already the la,Y, in that, even without ordinance No. 343, 
proof of a vehicle standing or parking in violation of 
an ordinance of Ogden City, together with proof that 
the defendant is the owner of that vehicle is prima facie 
evidence that the defendant owner committed or author-
ized the commission of such violation. 
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POINT I. 
APPELLANT 1S CONTENTION THAT IT IS BE-
YOND THE POWER OF OGDEN CITY TO PASS 
SUCH ORDINANCE NO. 343. 
The City's answer to this contention of the appel-
lant iR three-fold. First, it is subn1itted that the City 
has not only those powers ''given it directly by the 
constitution or statute, or such powers as may he reason-
ably implied as being necessary in the enforcement of 
such powers,'' but also those necessarily or fairly im-
plied in or incident to the powers expressly granted. 
Second, it is submitted that power to enact the ordi-
nance is necessarily implied under power delegated to 
it by statute. Third, it is submitted that Ordinance 
No. 343 is within the s12ecific grant of general police 
po,,·er as being. one necessary an<! 2r9p~rjg pr.ov!9!t, 
for the;~fety an<f~i~~h~. p_e~~~ and gooq,..,2rl!gr, 
comfort arid conveii"ience of the Cjty and its inh~bit~nt.s. 
---~·------ ·----··· 
First then, regarding the breadth of the powers of 
municipal corporations, we believe that one citation will 
be all that is necessary to open this avenue for the 
court. In Volume One, McQuillan on the Laws of Mu-
nicipal Corporatiot~, Second Edition, Section 367, Note 
41, it is said: 
''Every investigation, therefore, of its (the 
municipality's) powers must be conducted from 
the standpoint of such laws. Wherefore, the 
usual formula, invariably supported by judicial 
utterances and judgments, in substance is: That 
the only powers a municipal corporation pos-
sesses and can exercise are : ( 1) Those granted 
in express terms; (2) those necessarily or fairly 
2 
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implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly 
granted; and (3) tho"P t>ssential to the declared 
objects and purposes of the muncipality, not 
merely convenient, hnt indispensable. This rule 
is supported by a wealth of decisions in praci-
eally every state n~ illustrated by the more re-
C'ent ca~es set forth below.'' 
If the opinion of this eminent authority and the 
ra:-;t'~ cited h~- him establish the law to be as stated, 
and we believe they do, then it is submitted that Ordin-
a~~~. Xo_. ~43 is an exercise <?f a power ''fairly .implied 
ii1 O,E. incident _to tJ.Ie powrrs _Er~:l?ressly gTanted~" As 
will appear from our argument on the second division 
of this point. the circumstances are such that the power-
to regulate traffic and parking on the public streets is 
absolutely aborted unless it carries with it the. p_ow~;_ 
to establish such rp.les of evidence as make it practi-
caif~~-possible to enfor-ce th~ parldng ~egulations. Ce;. 
tilii~fy- the means of enforcement of~--a~-- regulatio~ is 
"fairly" implied in the power to make the regulation. 
The city contents that the power to enact that 
ordinance is necessarily implied under the power dele-
gated to it by statute. Section 57-7-85, Utah Code An-
notated, 1943, provides in part as follows: 
'' (a) The provisions of this act are intended 
to confer upon local authorities the right of, and 
shall not be deemed to deprive said authorities 
of existing powers with respect to streets and 
highways under their jursdiction and within the 
reasonable exercise of the police power in: 
"(1) Regulating the standing or parking of 
vehicleSiilclucling· the requirement for payment 
ota parking fee which fee may vary in order to 
i:elieve traffic congestion in de signa ted areas.'' ~ 11.,J,Ar'l-· 3---- -~~ l 
'I ... .N P1r- -~,,..-~, ~~-v •• ~ ~~-"'~~ ,, /- ., .- ~_,,,,,._.. d s~-vt--t~ 
-;L . b-. ~ l 
. ' 
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That section was enacted in 1941, and it expressly 
reserves to local authorities their ''existing powers'' 
to regulate the standing or parking of vehicles on streets 
and highways. What were the "existing powers" in 
those matters~ Prior to the enactment in 1941 of the 
Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, of which 
Act Section 57-7-85 above quoted is one section, the 
local authoritieH had much broader powers over traffic, 
use of the streets, and the like. Some of those powers 
are defined in the following code sections: 
Section 15-8-11, l;tah Code Annotated, 1943: 
''They (boards of commissioners and city 
councils of cities) may regulate the use of streets, 
alleys avenues, sidewalks, crosswalks, parks and 
public grounds, prevent and remove obstruC-
tions and encroachments thereon, ..... " 
Section 15-8-30, Utah Code Annotated, 1943: 
( 
"'1_1hey may regulate the movement of traffic 
on the streets, sidewalks and public places, ... '' 
Section 15-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1943: 
''They may pass all ordinances and rules, 
and make all regulations, not ~ugant.)o law~.. 
necessary for carrying _ i:qJ:Q:_ eif.ec.Lor discharg-
ing all powers and duties conferred by .~his ch§4Q-
ter' an"CTSiiCna'Sirenecessary and proper to 
provide for the safety and preserve the health, 
and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, 
peace and good order, comfort and convenience 
of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for 
the protection of property therein; and may 
enforce obedience. to such ordinances with such 
~es or pe!lifti~·; ·~~. ~~~i-~~y-<lee~ _pro_pe:; pro: .. 
4 
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rided, that the punishn1ent of any offense shall 
be by fine in any snm less than $300 or by im-
prisonment not to exceed si~ months, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment.'' 
The city contends that the enactment of the Uni-
form Traffic Act, by Section 57-7-85, reserved to Ogden 
Cit_Lallrights as to parking of vehicles on its streets _ d:. ~ 
that had theretofore been delegated to the city by the ~ I..JJ, 
sections of the code ~hove quott>d. It follows that the)~ r.,~ Je 
city's power to enact ~~-t~- ?n~innuc~ No. -~-1.?i§ derive~ l J-· ~ 
not only from Section 57::-J-85, rtah_ C..Q<!~---AEn()!ated,f' 
1943, but a~he--p~~,.e-~:s delegated by Sections--i5-8-li,! 
-~ . . - - i 
30 and 84, l-:-tah Code Annotated, 1943. -' 
These sections give the pow·er to Ogden City to 
regulate parking on its streets~ and, if it desires, to 
exact a parking fee for said parking. They give the 
eity powers as broad and as all inclusive as can be stated 
in all matters relating to parking and standing vehicles 
on its streets. Indeed, it appears the local authorities 
are given the exclusive right to control and regulate- ...4-
parking within their own boundaries. ~ ~ ~ ~ 
It is common knowledge that because of the num-~~ 
her of motor vehicles involved, the miles of parking 
space, the limited number of police officers, and the 
other limitations of time and facilities, l!..J-__~_ p~actically a.l;e 
impossible for th~ police offic~rs to observe and arrest~ 
t~~ p_ersou wh~ actually parks a vehicle in violation of ~·~~/ 
the par~~~g~~a'!s. For e.:xample, !~ere -~r~}!~7 parking -2~~.~ 
meters in~ Ogde11_ ~~ity.,., They are along both sides of ~ 
Slreets totaling ~imately two miles in length. It 
would requir~ officer full time during the hours the 
~~~ 
~;~· 
-;t;b 
5 
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meters are required to be operated for each half block 
of meters to actually observe the persons parking the 
same. 
Consider the other parking laws---parking in alleys, 
by fire hydrants, in theater zones, and the like. From 
the very nature of the violation, it is very rare that a 
police officer o1· an interested citizen actually observes 
the drivers park in violation of such laws. The prac-
tical situtation is that an- officer or someone affected 
thereby observes a vehicle unlawfully parked. The 
driver might not return to the vehicle for hours; and 
undoubtedly o ftime~ the person who drives the vehicle 
away is not the person who parked it. h i There are just not enough police officers in Ogden r City and undoubtedly not in . any other city to wait by JA~ each improperly parked vehicle until the driver returns. 
rJI"' (, 4' And even if there were, if appellant's arguments are 
~ · ,1'·/ followed to t~ei~ logical concl.usions, i~ is impossible in 
/- the great maJonty of cases for the City to prove that 
the person who gets into an improperly parked car 
and drives it away is the person who improperly parked 
the same. 
It follows from the practical situtation and physi-
cal facts that parking laws cannot reasonably be en-
forced by the city unless the registered owner of the 
vehicle which is parked in violation of any of the park-
ing laws is prima facie responsible for the violation 
of that law. 
The legislatu:re has delegated plenary powers to 
the cities to control and regulate parking. Does that 
means the cities have the power only to enact ordinance 
6 
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defining- what is and what i~ not lPg-nl parking, or doeH 
it mean that the city, con~idPring all the ph.n-1ieal condi-
tions and eircumstaneP~ can al:-;o gi,·e those parking 
ordinances life and enforcPnbility by providing that the 
owner of vehiclPs i:-; prima faeiP responsible for 
the parking violations? It i~ not to he presumed that 
the legislature did a ns<'h'ss thing when it gave cities (},j--· ~ 
power to control and regulate parking·. It follows that ; ~ -1 .l,# 
the cities han the implied power to enaet such ordinaces ?~ 
as make the parking ordinances enforceable. Ogden l · 
City's ordinan~_t' X o. 343 is such !:ln ordinance. 
The same argument as herein made by the appel-
lant has been made in other like cases, to which the 
same answer has been given by the city there involved. 
In the case of People v. Bigman, 38 Calif. App. 
2d Supp. 773, 100 P. (~) 370, the Supreme Court of 
California had before it an interpretation of the validity 
of utatute whose provisions were substantially iden-
tical to the provisions of the ordinances here before the 
court, and the court, in finding that the statute was 
constitutional and within the legislative powers of the 
state, said as follows : 
~'The great convenience _to the state through 
operat:loi1()!1his presumption ill the proof. of 
identity of operators in cases of illegal parking 
on the thousands of miles of highways in the 
state or to the officers of a municipality in en-
forcing the laws within the more limited but still 
relatively extensive public streets therein, is 
readily apparent. It is a matter of common 
knowledge, of which we may take notice, that 
it would be, and has in fact been, impractical for 
7 
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a city the size of that wherein this prosecution 
arose (Los Angeles; and we do not doubt that 
the same is relatively true in municipalities 
throughout the state) to maintain a police force 
large enough to personally detect any substan-
tial portion of vehicular parking law violators 
by observing them in the act of illegal parking 
or by discovering the illegally parked vehicle 
and awaiting the return of the absent operator;.;. 
The extent of the convenience to the state it 
' seems apparent to us, will far outweigh such 
inconvenience as may be occasioned to some 
registered owners whose automobiles when used 
by others may be illegally parked and result in 
the owners having to appear and answer the 
charges. In such instances, however, except in 
the comparatively rare cases of stolen or unlaw-
fully mcved cars, the owners can protect them-
selves by permiting their automobiles to be used 
only by persons who will be responsible to them 
for any unlawful parking of the vehicles. In any 
event, the in-convenience is basically caused not 
by the operation of the presumption of identity 
of the operator but rather by the violation by 
the actual operator of the substantive law in-
volved. In no way whatsoever does the opera-
tion of the presumption preclude the owner from 
his right to challenge the fact as to who did 
operate the vehicle.'' 
In the case of City of Chicago v. Crane, 319 Ill . .App. 
623, 49 N. E. (2) 802, (1943), the problem there before 
the court was much the same as here, and on the question 
of the difficulties of arresting the person who actually 
parked the vehicle, the court said : 
"It is common knowledge that many thousands of 
automobiles are parked in the streets at all times, 
8 
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and it would be inconYenient and impossible for 
a municipality such a~ Chicago to keep watch 
over the parked vehicles to nsecrtain who in fact 
operated or parked them.'' 
In a .Mas.saehusetts case, Commuuwealth v. Ober, 
:2811 Jlass. 25, 189 S.E. 60±, the eourt said: 
'• In the instant case, the public mischief to be 
averted is obvious. The inconvenience of keep-
ing watch over parked vehicles to ascertain who 
in fact operates them would be impracticable, 
if not impossible, at a time when many vehicles 
are parked. \Ve think the rules and regulations 
of the Boston Traffic Commission . . . were 
framed and intended to cover and make punish-
able any ·dolations of Section 31 (5), 1917 (4) 
by the o"\vner of the registered vehicle, whether 
the particular violation or violations were by 
the owner or were by a person allowed, permitted 
or suffered by the owner of any vehicle registered 
in his name, in any street, way, highway, road 
or parkway under the control of the City of 
Boston.'' 
Where the same question was before the :Missouri 
court in City of St. Louis v. Cook, 221 S.W. (2) 468, 
the court said : 
''From a practical standpoint it would be im-
possible for the poliee department of the City 
of St. Louis to keep a watch over all parked 
vehicles to ascertain who in fact operates them. 
In such a situation and in view of the purpose 
of City's traffic regulations, the City having 
shown the vehicle to have been parked in violation 
of the regulatory ordinance and having shown a 
defendant to he the person in whose name the 
9 
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vehicle is registered, it would seem an owner-
registrant, a defendant, could not be said to be 
put to great an inconvenience or to an unreason-
able hardship in making an explanation if he 
desires. The connection between the registered 
owner of an automobile and its operation is a 
natural one. While there are no doubt instances 
where an owner's automobile is used without his 
authorization, yet it is not generally so. If, in 
fact, defendant's vehicle was parked at the time 
without any authorization from defendant, such 
fact was peculiarly within defendant's knowledge 
and, if defendant had desired, the fact could 
have been easily proved with such certainty as 
to almost entirely preclude a false conviction. 
In our opinion the inference authorized by the 
Ordinance No. 41240 is a reasonable one. The 
ordinance does not make any inferred fact con-
clusive. And the ordinance does not require that 
a defendant testify; nor does it deny him his 
right to make out his defense, or to testify.'' 
Of course, there are not the number of vehicles in 
Ogden City that there are in Chicago, Boston, Los 
Angeles, and St. Louis, which are the cities the cited cases 
concern. However, there also are not the number of 
police officers in Ogden City that there are in those 
large cities, and the arguments mentioned in those 
cases apply with equal force to a city the size of Ogden. 
In Commonwealth v. Kroger, 122 S.W. (2) 1006, the 
Supreme Court of Kentucky had before it an ordinan~ 
of the citx.._ of Newport, Kentuck.z. The defendant made 
the contention that the authority to make such a prima 
facie statute was not given the city by the legislature 
of the state, the defendant maintaining that while it 
was competent for a state legislature to provide for 
10 
• 
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the creation of prima facie presumptions, that right was 
not possessed by municip::l legislatiYe boards. The 
~
Supreme Court of Kentucky found that by necessary 
implication, thl' grant. of authority by the legislatu~e 
to the rity to legislate under the eneral police power 
\Yas sufficient to reg·ulate traffic, and having regu~ 
traffic, it was like·wise proper for them to :g_rov~e fQ.L 
sucE._a; rule <?f e~·icle1!~~ ~.S_.necessary for effective en-
forcement. 
Counsel contends that the courts of this state are 
created by the Constitution and by statutes passed by 
the State Legislature, and that cities are not given 
power of any sort over such courts. It is submitted that 
within the scope of authority which has been delegated 
to cities, they may enact ordinances which the courts 
of this state must recognize. We fail to see what appel-
lant means by his contention that the cities have no 
power over tge~ c<_>~s. Certainly, within the realm of 
delegated powers, the courts are bound by the ordinances 
the cities enact. So, the problem reverts back to the 
initial contention and the initial problem, and that is 
whether or not in this case Ogden City has the express 
or implied power to enact its ordinance No. 343. If the 
city does have that power, then the ordinance is bind-
~ng on the courts. If It does not have that power,· tl}~ 
ordinance is invalid and therefore not binding on the 
courts. We submit that the ordinance is valid and bind-
Ing. 
As to the third division of our argument on this 
point, it is observed that by the provisions of Section 
15-8-84 cities are granted not only power to pass ordi-
nances necessary for carrying into effect powers and 
11 
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duties specifically conferred, but also ''such as are neces-
sary and proper to provide for the safety, ... 1mpro~ 
the morals, peace and good order, comfort and conven-
i"ence ot tfie e1Hes an<l tile Inhabitants thereof a~d f~r ~------~~----~--------~~~~~---~A~ the rotection of property therein." (Italics added). 
We believe t a 1s cou Wl ake judicial notice of 
the dangers, the breaches of the peace and the chaos, 
the discomfort and inconvenience which would inevitably 
result in any American city of any size, in this motor-
ized age, if there were no effective regulations of the 
parking of private vehicles upon the city streets. The 
streets would be monopolized and traffic obstructed by 
the selfish and unsocial among vehicle operators. Their 
activities would inevitably provoke the resentment arrd 
retaliation of other citizens. For all practical purposes 
the business district of a modern city can not exist as 
a comfort and convenience to the citizens unless the 
parking of vehicles can be effectively regulated by the 
local public authont,y. Property values would inevitably 
fall and the city as an effective and funnctioning social 
unit would be paralized if such regultions were not 
effective. 
Perhaps this picture is to some extent exaggerated, 
but if so, the exaggeration is slight. 
r:rhis court has held in the case of Gronlund vs. 
Salt Lake City Utah , 194 Pac. 2nd 464, that 
this general g-rant of police power to cities is sufficient 
to support a Sunday closing law so long as it also vio-
lates no c_£nstitutional pr_wision. Certahify if the· closin.s.. 
of businesses on Sunsl~.I...J§.~ll .... tJI.~ p;9wers of ~ 
cUJ:, the power to make effective -parking regulations 
~or Y§h]£1~ w§ic!i ~s e~en ill.?l~~ssary o ~P..~~ 
12 
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' (~~ ~:~~~ ~"- .. :--~~- __ ,. _..,. --- ~--
--.........__~-~~·~;;~~·· 
---~~_ti~~-i~ also within the-~ An~l--~~--}~_~1~-~~~n 
J?O_illt~l out 1H'rt>ttl~o_n~._ tl:'_' en!o_~~~~~§I1~ ___ qL_~ P!!.!-~~~1~· 
regnlat~111_i~ a~ a pr!:etivat' -inn:~impossih1e unless the 
rule e~tahli~lwd hY Onliumwe No. 343 is aYailahle to the /A. 
:----:--~--:--:-:--- ·- ------ ------ - ~- . ------
local authorities. It seems clear that the power to pass 
Urdn1ance X o. 3-!3 ~s specifit·ally included in the grant .--" 
of powers to provide foi>the general welfare Jts above 
----~ quoted. 
\Ye submit that the appellant's point number one 
is not well taken. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT SUCH 
ORDIXAXCE NO. 343 IS UNCONSTITUTION-
AL UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, IN THAT IT DENIES HIM CERTAIN 
PRIVILEGES GRANTEiD HIM UNDER SUCH 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
It is difficult for the city to understand how the 
appellant can urge that ordinance No. 343 is unconti-
tutional when, on Page 9 of his brief and again on Page 
14, he indicates that had the State Legislature enacted 
the same ordinance, it would have been within its au-
thority. However, we are answering the contentions 
made by the appellant, ( 1) that the ordinance denies 
the accused the presumption of innocence until proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) that the 
ordinance in effect makes the defendant take the wit-
ness stand against his will. 
To see if this ordinance denies the accused the pre-
sumption of innocence until he is proven guilty beyond 
13 
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reasonable doubt, we must deterine what the words 
''prima facie evidence'' mean in the ordinance. The 
words "prima facie evidence" are used in Section 103-
36-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, wherein it is provided: 
''Possession of property recently stolen, when 
the person in possession fails to make a satisfac-
tory explanation, shall he deemed prima facie 
evidence of guilt.'' 
The meaning of ''prima facie evidence'' in that 
8tatute has been repeatedly interpreted and defined 
by the decisions of this court. One of the earliest such 
decisions, and one of the most complete, is the case of 
State v. Potello, 119 P. 1023, 40 Utah 56. It is there 
determined as follows: 
"Now, what is meant by the term 'prima facie' 
as here used in the statute~ If the meaning to 
be given it is that, unless rebutted by other evi-
dence, or discredited ,by circumstances, it he-
comes, conclusive of the fact of guilt and to 
operate upon the minds of the jury as decisive 
of that fact, a meaning sometimes given the term 
(Kelly v. Jackson, 31 U. S. 622, 9 L. Ed. '523; 
State v. Burlingame, 146 Mo.-- 207, 48 S. · W. 72) 
then again are we of the opinion that the legis-
lature would have encroached upon the judiciary. 
That is to say, we would be of such opinion, if, 
upon the proof of the facts which the legislature 
has declared shall be deemed and unexplained, 
the jury would be required to find the accused 
guilty of the alleged offense, though they should 
not be convinced of his guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. We, however, are of the opinion 
that the term 'prima facie' is not used in the 
statute in that sense. It frequently is used in 
14 
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::-;tatutes similar to th, statntP here in question 
in the sense of only presumptive evidence. (Stat P 
, .. Hardelein, 169 ~Io. 3 7D. 70 S. W. 130; State 
Y. Intoxicating Liquors, 80 ..\lo. 37, 12 Atl. 794; 
~tate Y. K.line, 50 Ore. 426, 93 Pne. 237; Moore 
, .. Hopkins, 83 Cal. 270, 23 Pac. 318, 17 A.m. St. 
Rep. 248) 
"In that ::;en::;e \\·e think it is used in this statute. 
1,hat is, it is declared by the statute that l'.!:.2!!L 
the roYen facts of the larcen recent osses-
swn in the defendant1 and his ailure to satls-
fictorily ~xplain his~ _Eoss_es~i()Il, an inference 
or presumption a~·_!se§_,__~~nl~~s __ re ~~!I~<l~ 
evidence or discredit~d by . circustances, of. the 
further eilihng fact' fiiaT18 -was the- Cie£e:rlaa;t 
wnoc t\~1oiiiousl);. toOk the' prop;rty;t1e person ... 
w1io committed the -r;;ov·ea ""larceny, and hence 
a prima facie case of guilt is made against him. 
Not that the jury, on such proven facts, though 
unrebutted or not discredited by circumstances, 
are required to convict if upon such . proven 
facts they are not convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt of the accused's guilt, but that they, 
upon such proven facts, if unrebutted or not 
discredited by circumstances, may presume or 
infer the further fact of the felonious taking 
by the accused, and if, upon all the evidence 
adduced, they are convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt of his guilt, may convict.'' 
~rhe later cases of State v. Berretta, et al, 47 Utah 
479, 155 P. 343, and State v. Donovan, 77 Utah 343, 294 P. 
1108, also clearly indicate that "prima facie evidence", 
as used in the statute, is for the direction of the court 
as distinguished from the trier of the fact, be it judge 
or jury, and that when ''prima facie evidence'' of guilt 
15 
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has been introduced by the state, even though that 
evidence is unrebutted and uncontradicted, the trier 
of the fact still must determine from all the evidence 
whether or not the defendant 1s guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 
In St. Louis v. Cook, supra, Ordinance No. 41240 
read: 
''The presence of any vehicle in or upon any 
public street. . . in violation of any ordinance 
regulating the parking of such vehicle ... shall 
be prima facie evidence that the person ; ... in 
whose name such vehicle is registered on either 
the records of the City License Collector or the 
records of the Secretary of State of the State 
of .Missouri, committed or authorized such vio-
lation.'' 
As to that, the Illinois court ~aid : 
''The Ordinance No. 41240 does not in any way 
change the burden of proof the city must carry 
in making out a case, although the ordinance 
does affect the burden of evidence. See the ex-
position of the difference between burden of 
proof which does not shift and the burden of 
evidence \\rhich may shift to a defendant to pro-
duce, if he desires, evidence which, if believed, 
will meet a plaintiff's prima facie case. McClos-
key v. Koplar, 329 1fo. 527, at Page 541, 46 S. 
W. 2d 557, at page 563, 92 A. L. R. 641; Vol. 
IX, Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., S 2485, pp. 
270-274 and S 2487, pp. 278-284." 
In People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N. W. 
248, the court was charged with determining the vali-
dity of a prima facie ordinance passed by the city of 
16 
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same to have been unlawfully imported. The court 
put aside the point made by the defendant that the 
practical effect of the statute was to compel the accused 
person to witness against himself. Said the court: 
? 
'' lhe statute com;gel3 11Qthi.!l_$· It does no more 
than to make possession of the prohibited article 
prima facie evidence of guilt. It leaves th~ 
aceused entirely free to testify or not as, he 
ehoose:-;. If the accu:-;ed happens -to~ be the .. onlv 
'repositm-y of the facts necessary to negativ~ 
the presumption arising from his possession, 
that is a misfortune which the statute under re-
view does not create but which is inherent in the 
case. The same situation might present itself 
if there were no statutory presumption and a 
prima facie case of concealment with knowledge 
of unlawful importation were made by the evi-
dence. The necessity of an explanation by the 
accused would be quite as compelling in that 
case as in this; but the constraint upon him to 
give testimony would arise there, as it arises 
here, simply from the force of the circumstances 
and not from any form of compulsion forbidden 
by the Constitution.'' 
In the case of City of St. Lou,is v. Cook, supra, 
the appellant made the same argument as here made, 
and the court held that the defendant was not deprived 
of any constitutional right, such as being made to take 
the witness stand against himself. 
On Pages 10 and 11 of appellant's brief, he seems 
to argue that Ordinance No. 343 is unreasonable be-
cause it is a common knowledge that in many instances 
the registered owner is not the sole user of his auto-
18 
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mohih'. Tlw Cit~· <Hlmit~ t hn t thP powPr of a legisla-
tiYe body to 1nak~ the proof of rertain fact~ prima facie 
evidence of other fart~. a~ i~ done by Ordinance No. 
343, is limited in that the faet pre~nmed must reasonably 
flow from the farts proven. As said in State 1'. Potello, 
supra, Page 67 of Utah Reports: 
"It undoubtedly is the established rule by the 
great weight of authority that the legislature 
has the power to declare that certain facts shall 
be prima facie, presumptive or conclusive, evi-
dence of another and substantive fact essential 
to convict when they haYe some general relation 
to or connection with such other fact.'' 
The presumption that the registered owner of a vehicle 
parked his car or authorized the parking of his car in 
violation of a parking ordinance naturally and rea-
sonably flows from the fact that he is the registered 
owner of the vehicle concerned. It has been so held 
in St. Lou-is r. Cook, supra, City of Chica.go v. Crane, 
supra; People v. Rubin, 284 N. Y. 392, 31 N. E. (2) 501. 
The court said in People v. Bigman, supra, Page 
372: 
''Relationship between the registered owner of 
an automobile and its operation is natural; if 
he is not the operator on any occasion that fact 
is directly within his knowledge and in the ordi-
nary course of events can easily be proved with 
such certainty as almost entirely to exclude the 
possibilty of a false conviction.'' 
In People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N. W. 248, 
(1938), testimony showed that in Detroit on Ja_nuary 
14 and 15, 1938, in cases where an automobile was 
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parked in violation of an ordinance, the owner parked 
it 87.6% of the cases, members of the owner's immedi-
ate family in 8% of the cases, and some other person 
in 4.4% of the cases. 
The city's ordinance No. 343 doe~ not deprive the 
accused of any right secured to him by the Federal or 
State Constitutions. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE 
CITY IS ENCROACHING UPON THE FUNC-
TIONS OF THE JUDICIARY, AND THE 
STATE LEGISLATURE. 
Here again the contention is merely another way 
to state appellant's Point I. If the city has the ex-
ress or implied power to enact Ordinance No. 343, the 
ordinance is binding upon the judiciary. If it has that 
power, the enacting of the ordinance is no J1lOre an en-
croachment of the functions of the judiciary .QL upon 
the--f~n~~t-ions gf the state legislat~'e than for the _city 
to ena<;~ an O!'<fin~E_C~~ under the powers delegated to 
it, for example, i!l~ _E2_ection 15-8-4], Uta_h Code An-
notated, l943, to suppress or prohibit prostitution and 
gambling and other -reiate'd- activities. There are legi;ia~ 
tive fields in which -b~ti1-th_e_ state legislature and the city 
commission of Ogden City can act without one encroach-
ing upon the other. The question is whether or not 
Ogden City has the express or implied power to enact 
that ordinance. 
It is submitted that the appellant has misconceived 
the ruling in State v. Patella, supra. That case held 
that by the express words of the Utah statute, to make 
20 
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a prima facie case of lnrreny, tht"' state had to prove 
the aeeused had possession of rcePntly stolen pro-
perty, and that he failed to gi,·e a ~atifaetory explana-
tion therefor. 
The court in said case did not hold that had the 
statute provided that mere possession of recently stolen 
property was prinut facie eYidence of guilt would be 
unconstitutional. The court did hold that if the sta-
tute made mere possession of recently stolen property 
conclusire evidence of quilt, that it would be unconsti-
tutional. 
It seems to the city that the case clearly interprets 
what is meant by prima facie evidence, and it clearly 
holds that the statute passed by the State Legislature 
complies with the constituional provisions and is valid. 
11he appellant's brief. says at Page 13: 
''Ogden City's ordinance stops just where the 
legislation, assumed in the language of the court 
in the Potello case, stopped. It makes the mere 
ownership of the car, and proof that the car was 
illegally parked by someone, proof of the guilt 
of the owner. ~rhis clearly then is an attempt 
by the city to impose upon the courts of this 
state a substantive rule of evidence, which the 
state legislature, even with its much broader 
power, could not do under the language of the 
above quoted case, without imposing upon the 
functions of the judiciary. ' ' 
Ogden City's ordinance does not attempt to do 
what was condemned in the Potello case. Ogden City's 
ordinance still makes the proof of ownership and vio-
lation of the ordinance only prima facie evidence of 
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guilt, not conclusive. Under the ordinance, the de-
fendant must be found guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
POINT IV 
APPIDLLANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE 
CITY HAS NEVER RECEIVED AUTHORITY 
FROM THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION rro 
PLACE· PARKING METERS UPON ST.ATE 
HIGHvVAYS WITHIN ITS BORDERS. 
The stipulation of facts does not include anything 
concerning whether or not Ogden City has received per-
mission from a State Road Commission to install park-
ing meters on 24th Street. There is, therefore, no evi-
dence one way or the other before this court. It is 
presumed that a city exercise its powers in a lawful 
manner, and it is submitted that until evidence is in-
troduced to the contrary, it should be presumed that 
Ogden City placed parking meters on 24th Street with 
permission of the State Road Commission. 
Whether or not the State Road Commission has 
given that authority to Ogden City is not a matter of 
which this court can take judicial notice. The appel-
lant should have introduced evidence on this question 
in the district court, or should have required the sti-
pulation to cover the same. However, if this court can 
take judicial notice of the actions of the Road Com-
mission in this matter, it will learn that the State Road 
Co~mission interprets ·the words ''traffic control de-
vice" in Section 57-7-88, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
as not. to include parking meters. The Commission 
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therefore permit:::; any iH~t:lll:1tion b~· local authorities 
of parking· meter~ on any and all state highways ai 
the sole discretion of the local authorities. 
It is further submitted that the qw:-stion of whether 
or not Ogden C'ity has permission from the State Road 
Commission to erert parking meters on a state high-
way is a matter which is between Ogden City and the 
~tate Road Commission, and that the users of the 
highways are not proper parties to such a controversy. 
As long as traffic control devices and parking meters 
haYe been installed and are in use, the drivers of vehicles 
should observe and comply with the directions of those 
traffic control devices. 
:Moreover, section 57-7-85 expressly negatives any 
legislative intention to deprive local authorities of 
authority to regulate parking and charge a fee there-
for by any device. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF IN THIS ACTION WAS NOT 
GIVEN DUE NOTICE OF ANY ACTION CON-
TEMPLATED BY THE CITY. 
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the stipulation of facts 
show that the jurisdiction of the city court over the 
appellant is based upon the issuance of a complaint, 
followed by the issuance and service of a summons 
upon the appellant ordering him to appear on a date 
certain to answer the charges in the complaint threto-
fore filed. Ogden City makes no claim of jurisdiction 
over the appellant arising out of the placing of the 
ticket on the windshield of appellant's automobile. There 
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was personal service of summons upon the appellant; 
he was therefore served by one of the three methods 
which the appellant himself, in Page 16 of his brief, 
says is an authororized method of service. 
The like point was raised in Chicago v. Crane supra, 
where the court held : 
'' rrhe contention of defendant made at the open-
ing of the trial (he has filed no brief in this 
court) seems to be that the court did not acquire 
jurisdiction over him because the police officer 
attached a ticket to the parked automobile. This 
is clearly a misapprehension. The city does not 
claim it obtained jurisdiction in this manner 
but says that afterwards a complaint was filed, 
a warrant issued and he was taken on the warrant 
and appeared in the trial of the case. Obviously 
the court had jurisdiction over him.'' 
CITY'S POINT I 
':rHA':r ORDINANCE No. 343 IS :MERELY DE-
CLARATIVE OF WHAT WAS ALREADY 
THE LAW, IN THAT, EVEN WITHOUT ORDI-
NANCE No. 343, PROOF OF A VEHICLE 
STANDING OR PARKING IN VIOLATION OF 
AN ORDINANCE OF OGDEN CITY TOGE 
THER WITH PROOF THAT THE DEFEND-
ANT IS THE OWNER OF THE VEHICLE IS 
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE THAT THE 
DEFENDANT OWNER COMMITTED OR 
AUTHORIZED THE COJYIMISSION OF SUCH 
VIOLATION. 
It has been held that though there was no ordinance 
or statute defining prima facie evidence, a city makes a 
prima facie case in a trial for a parking violation by pro-
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ing only that the defendant is the rPgi8tered owner of the 
vehicle and that ~aid ,·ehiclc was parked in violation of 
a parking ordinance. In People :-. Rubin, 28-t- N. Y. 
39:2, 31 X. E. (:2) 501, the court said: 
H The defendant a l~o contends that violation of 
the ordinance wns not proved. The record on 
this point is ver~· brief. The defendant conceded 
that the police officer who made the charges 
found the car in question parked at the times 
and places charged in the city and county of 
X e\Y York for the length of time charged in the 
complant and that the defendant was the licensed 
owner of the car in each instance. No evidence 
was offered by the defendant. No question is 
made of the right of the magistrate to take judi~ 
cial notice of the character of the localities as 
fallmg within the description of the regulation. 
'rhe concession made out a prima facie case. 
The contrary is urged because there was no di-
rect proof that the stationing of the car in vio-
lation of the ordinance was done by the defend-
ant. To rule that this inference may not be 
drawn from the established facts would be to 
deny to the trier of the facts the right to use 
a common process of reasoning. Justice v. Lang, 
52 N. Y. 323. Ownership of a vehicle in civil 
cases has long been recognized as prima facie 
proof that it was being operated by or for the 
owner. Potts v. Pardee, 220 N. Y. 431, 116 N. 
E. 78, 8 A. L. R. 785 ; St. Andrassy v. Mooney, 
262 N. Y. 268, 186 N. E. 867. Here, ownership 
has been held a sufficient basis for an inference 
of personal conduct. If he was not in control 
he could easily have produced a witness or wit-
nesses to show it. People v. Dyle, 21 N. Y. 578; 
People ex rei. Woronoff v. Mallon, 222 N. Y. 
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456, 465, 119 N. E. 102, 4 A. L. R. 463. We find 
it competent under the circumstances to con-
clude from the proof that the owner of the car 
controlled the car and personally violated the 
regulation. Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 
25, 189 N. E. 601. Of. People v. Kayne, 286 
Mich. 571, 282 N. W. 248." (Italics Added) 
In City of St. Louis v. Cook, supra, the court said on 
this point: 
''Even when there had been no legislative ac-
tion enacting such a rule of evidence the infe-
renc that the owner parked or was responsible 
for the parking of a vehicle has been held to be 
reasonable and sufficient, City of Chicago v. 
Crane, 319 Ill. App. 623, 49 N. E. 2d 802; People 
v. Rubin, 284 N". Y. 392, 31 N. E. 2d 501, although 
the supreme court of the State of Rhode Island 
was evenly divided on the question, State v. 
Morgan, 72 R. I. 101, 48 A. (2d) 248." 
There is thus very good authority for the proposi-
' tion that the city's ordinance No. 343 merely -declares 
. what is a rule of evidence in full for~e and ~-ff~ct -~·nd 
-----~~---~ ~ . -
binding on the courts, even had that ordinance not. 
been enacted. It foilo\\'s that The -·ordinance, "·whiTe~ it · 
maybe -unnecess~uy, nevert'h.eless 'rs-v;lid. ~ ....... ...- ' 
-- -----
CONCLUSION 
Ordinance K o. 343 of Ogden City is thus sup-
ported and authorized on three grounds, any one of 
which would be sufficient: 
a. Its enactment is within the fairly or neces-
sarily implied powers delegated to the city by 
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.. _ 
Sections 15-8-11. 30 and 57-7-85, U. C. A., 1943. 
b. Its enactment is within the express powers 
deleg·ated to the city by Sertion 15-8-84, U. C. A., 
1943, to promote the peace, g·ood order and con-
Yenience of the city and its inhabitants. 
e. It is merely declatory of a rule of evidence 
which exish;; without the ordinance and as a re-
sult of a common process of reasoning from the 
facts of the case. 
The ordinance denies to the accused no rights 
given by the State or Federal Constitutions. No en-
croachment is made On the legisla tiYe Or judiciary 
branches of the state. 
Jurisdiction of the defendant was obtained In a 
manner authorized. 
This court should therefore affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
Respondent's Address : 
.Municipal Building 
Ogden, Utah 
Respectfully submitted, 
Paul Thatcher 
Clyde C. Patterson 
Charles H. Sneddon 
Jack A. Richards 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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